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Economic Projections and Rules of Thumb
for Monetary Policy
Athanasios Orphanides and Volker Wieland
Monetary policy analysts often rely on rules of thumb, such as the Taylor rule, to describe historical
monetary policy decisions and to compare current policy with historical norms. Analysis along these
lines also permits evaluation of episodes where policy may have deviated from a simple rule and
examination of the reasons behind such deviations. One interesting question is whether such rules
of thumb should draw on policymakers’ forecasts of key variables, such as inflation and unemploy-
ment, or on observed outcomes. Importantly, deviations of the policy from the prescriptions of a
Taylor rule that relies on outcomes may be the result of systematic responses to information captured
in policymakers’ own projections. This paper investigates this proposition in the context of Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) policy decisions over the past 20 years, using publicly available
FOMC projections from the semiannual monetary policy reports to Congress (Humphrey-Hawkins
reports). The results indicate that FOMC decisions can indeed be predominantly explained in terms
of the FOMC’s own projections rather than observed outcomes. Thus, a forecast-based rule of thumb
better characterizes FOMC decisionmaking. This paper also confirms that many of the apparent
deviations of the federal funds rate from an outcome-based Taylor-style rule may be considered
systematic responses to information contained in FOMC projections. (JEL E52)
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can serve as a useful tool for understanding his-
torical monetary policy decisions (Poole, 2007).
In both his recent and earlier work, Poole high-
lighted the usefulness of rules of thumb in the
context of the complexity of the macroeconomy
and our limited knowledge regarding it. In this
light, a policy adviser cannot offer precise guid-
ance about how the monetary authority should
respond to every conceivable contingency to best
achieve its goals. What a policy adviser can do is
identify useful rules of thumb that can serve as
appropriate guides to policy under most cir-
cumstances. To the extent policymakers rely on
W
illiam Poole has been a long-time
proponent of rules of thumb for
monetary policy. Nearly four
decades ago, as staff economist at
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (BOG), Poole presented a reactive rule
of thumb that he argued could serve as a robust
guide to policy decisions (Poole, 1971). More
recently, as president of the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis and a member of the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC), he has high-
lighted how a simple Taylor rule that systemati-
cally responds to economic activity and inflation
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guide, it should be possible to identify this rule
and use it to understand historical policy deci-
sions and to improve future policy.
One of the difficulties in identifying a simple
rule that can serve as a useful description of policy
is that the policy prescriptions relevant for policy
advice at any point in time reflect the information
available to policymakers at that time. To the
extent policy is based on observable macroeco-
nomic variables, a simple rule could be estimated
using real-time historical data. However, to the
extent policymakers view projections of key
macroeconomic variables as more useful summary
descriptions of the current state of the economy,
estimation of a simple rule based on those same
policymaker projections would provide a more
promising avenue. Poole (2007) examines FOMC
policy decisions over the past 20 years using the
simple outcome-based rule proposed by Taylor
(1993). This rule uses the current inflation rate
and output gap as inputs for federal funds rate
decisions. Poole identifies some deviations of
policy from the systematic prescriptions suggested
by the rule that could, however, reflect a system-
atic response of the FOMC to its own projections.
Our objective in this paper is to investigate
this proposition. To this end we compare esti-
mated policy rules that are based on recent eco-
nomic outcomes with policy rules based on the
economic projections of the FOMC. We investi-
gate whether the federal funds rate target set by
the FOMC when these projections are made
responds systematically to these projections as
opposed to recent economic data.
Our results, which are based on real-time data
and projections over the past 20 years, indicate
that interest rates respond predominantly to
FOMC projections and thus that a forecast-based
rule better characterizes FOMC decisionmaking
during this period. Furthermore, we check to what
extent deviations from an outcome-based Taylor
rule may be better explained by the information
incorporated in FOMC forecasts. Our analysis
suggests that by distinguishing between forecasts
and outcomes one can explain a number of devi-
ations of policy from the simple underlying rule,
though it can also identify episodes where devi-
ations remain. This includes episodes where one
would expect systematic policy to deviate from a
simple rule of thumb, such as the response to
financial turbulence experienced in 1998.
Overall, our analysis suggests that FOMC
projections used in the context of a rule of thumb
are quite informative for understanding historical
monetary policy, whereas similar analysis based
on economic outcomes can often be of much lower
value.
ON RULES OF THUMB FOR
MONETARY POLICY
Simple estimated rules can be useful devices
for understanding historical monetary policy if
central banks conduct policy sufficiently system-
atically to be captured by such rules. Poole (1971)
suggested that it is reasonable for individual
policymakers to behave in a systematic manner:
Individual policy-makers inevitably use infor-
mal rules of thumb in making decisions. Like
everyone else, policy-makers develop certain
standard ways of reacting to standard situa-
tions. These standard reactions are not, of
course, unchanging over time, but are adjusted
and developed according to experience and
new theoretical ideas. (p. 151)
Though it did not attract much attention at
the time, the particular rule of thumb proposed
by Poole in 1971 is of interest in that it incorpo-
rated both a reaction of the interest rate to real
economic activity (specifically the deviation of
the unemployment rate from the Federal Reserve’s
estimate of the full employment rate at the time),
as well as a nominal variable in a way that would
ensure price stability over the long run. The latter
was not based on the response of the interest rate
to inflation, as is commonly specified today.
Rather, Poole’s rule specified that the money sup-
ply should always be contained within bounds
as a robust means of controlling inflation and
suggested adjusting the interest rate to respond
to deviations of unemployment from full employ-
ment only when doing so would respect these
bounds. In essence, Poole’s rule of thumb uses
money growth to ensure the maintenance of price
Orphanides and Wieland
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cyclical policy prescriptions. He provided the
following summary description:
The proposed rule assumes that full employ-
ment exists when the unemployment rate is
in the 4.0 to 4.4 per cent range. The rule also
assumes that at full employment, a growth rate
of the money stock of 3 to 5 per cent per annum
is consistent with price stability. Therefore,
when unemployment is in the full employment
range, the rule calls for monetary growth at the
3 to 5 per cent rate.
The rule calls for higher monetary growth
when unemployment is higher, and lower
monetary growth when unemployment is
lower. Furthermore, when unemployment is
relatively high the rule calls for a policy of
pushing the Treasury bill rate down provided
monetary growth is maintained in the specified
range; similarly, when unemployment is rela-
tively low the rule calls for a policy of pushing
the Treasury bill rate up provided monetary
growth is in the specified range. Finally, the
rule provides for adjusting the rate of growth
of money according to movements in the
Treasury bill rate in the recent past. (p. 183)
Poole also explicitly recognized a scope for
deviations from his suggested rule of thumb, even
if policymakers had decided to adopt it in prin-
ciple. What was more important in Poole’s view
was transparency in explaining the rationale for
such deviations:
It is not proposed that this rule of thumb or
guideline be followed if there is good reason
for departure. But departures should be justi-
fied by evidence and not be based on vague
intuitive feelings of what is needed since the
rule was carefully designed from the theoretical
and empirical analysis...and from a careful
review of post-accord monetary policy. (p. 183)
As to whether rules could usefully rely on
economic projections, Poole (1971) argued that
an important factor would be the accuracy of the
forecasts:
Given the accuracy of forecasts at the current
state of knowledge, it seems likely that for
some time to come forecasts will be used pri-
marily to supplement a policy-decisionmaking
process that consists largely of reactions to
current developments. Only gradually will
policy-makers place greater reliance on formal
forecasting models. (pp. 152-53)
In 2007, Poole used a version of the classic
Taylor (1993) rule to describe Federal Reserve
behavior over the past 20 years.1 As is well known,
this rule posits that the systematic component of
monetary policy may be described as a notional
target for the federal funds rate, fˆ:
(1)
where π and y reflect contemporaneous readings
of inflation and a measure of the output gap,
respectively. Following Taylor, Poole assumed a
constant inflation target, π*, and a constant equi-
librium real interest rate, r*. Poole’s rendition of
the Taylor rule is reproduced in Figure 1.
As in his work 36 years earlier, Poole (2007)
explained potential sources of deviation from the
rule and also the potential use of forecasts:
The FOMC, and certainly John Taylor himself,
view the Taylor rule as a general guideline.
Departures from the rule make good sense
when information beyond that incorporated
in the rule is available. For example, policy is
forward looking, which means that from time to
time the economic outlook changes sufficiently
that it makes sense for the FOMC to set a funds
rate either above or below the level called for
in the Taylor rule, which relies on observed
recent data rather than on economic forecasts of
future data. Other circumstances—an obvious
example is September 11, 2001—call for a
policy response. These responses can be and
generally are understood by the market. Thus,
such responses can be every bit as systematic
as the responses specified in the Taylor rule.
(p. 6)
This last remark suggests that a better rule
of thumb for understanding the behavior of the
Federal Reserve over the past 20 years could be a
version of the Taylor rule that is explicitly based
ˆ ..
** fr y = ++ − ( )+ ππ π 05 05 ,
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1 Taylor (1993) showed that the rule could describe Federal Reserve
behavior from 1987 to 1992 quite well. Interest rate rules had also
acquired a normative dimension at that time because of their success
inalarge-scalemodelcomparisonprojectreportedinBryant,Hooper,
and Mann (1993) (see also Henderson and McKibbin, 1993).on the FOMC’s own projections. This is the sub-
ject of the investigation that follows.
FOMC ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS
AND REAL-TIME OUTCOMES
We begin by describing how to construct
constant-horizon forecasts that can be used in
estimating a policy rule from publicly available
projections. The semiannual monetary policy
reports to Congress (the Humphrey-Hawkins
reports) have presented information on the range
and central tendency of annual forecasts of FOMC
members since 1979.2
Following Poole’s (2007) analysis, we create
a dataset of FOMC projections and corresponding
real-time data on observed outcomes that focuses
our attention on the past 20 years.3
Regarding projections, we take the midpoints
of the central tendencies reported in each of the
reports, starting with the February 1988 report and
ending with the July 2007 report, and use these
as proxies for the modal forecasts of FOMC expec-
tations. Our objective using these data is to exam-
ine whether deviations from an outcome-based
Taylor rule may be explained by the additional
information contained in policymakers’ forecasts.
These include inflation, the rate of unemployment,
and output growth. Because we could not make
approximate inferences of the FOMC forecasts of
the output gap from these variables, although we
do have the FOMC’s unemployment projections,
we focus on a version of the Taylor rule that sub-
stitutes the unemployment rate for the output gap.
Consequently, in our dataset we focus on data and
forecasts regarding inflation and unemployment.
2 A month after this paper was first presented, on November 14, 2007,
the Federal Reserve announced that going forward the FOMC would
compile and release these economic projections four times a year
instead of just two times a year, which was the practice until then.
Orphanides and Wieland








1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Percent
FOMC Meeting Dates
BOG Output Gap: CPI, 1987:09–2000:10
Federal Funds Rate
CBO Output Gap: CPI, 2000:11–2006:06
Figure 1
Poole’s (2007) Version of the Taylor Rule
NOTE: The solid blue line shows the Taylor rule constructed using the BOG real-time output-gap estimate. The blue dashed line
extends the rule using the output-gap estimate of the CBO for those years for which the BOG estimate is not yet public information.
3 In earlier work, Lindsey, Orphanides, and Wieland (1997), we
examined the implications of FOMC projections for understanding
policy in the sample prior to 1988 and presented some comparisons
with the 1988-96 period.Some of the particular measures have been
redefined over the years. For inflation, the implicit
deflator of the gross national product was used
through July 1988, thereafter replaced by the con-
sumer price index (CPI). In February 2000, the
CPI was replaced by the personal consumption
expenditures (PCE) deflator measure of inflation,
and from July 2004 onward the FOMC decided to
focus on the core PCE deflator that excludes food
and energy prices because of their volatility. These
changes are of particular interest because the
alternative measures do not always provide simi-
lar summary readings of inflationary pressures.
They may differ both in their level and in their
variability over time, especially in small samples,
which poses some interpretation challenges.
Tables 1 and 2 provide two recent examples
useful for understanding what information on
projections is released with the monetary policy
reports. Forecasts for 2007 were first reported in
July 2006 (not shown). In February 2007, revised
forecasts for 2007 and first forecasts for 2008 were
reported (Table 1). The final updated forecasts for
2007 were then published in July together with
updated forecasts for 2008 (Table 2).
Although we have only two observations per
year, it is convenient to describe our dataset in
terms of a quarterly frequency because the FOMC
projections report either quarterly data or growth
rates over four quarters. Denoting time (measured
in quarters) with t, we associate the February
Humphrey-Hawkins report with the first quarter
of the year and the July Humphrey-Hawkins report
with the third quarter. We construct a dataset con-
taining two sets of forecasts for each year, cover-
ing four-quarter intervals that always end three
quarters in the future. For any variable x, let xt+i|t
denote the estimated outcome (for i ￿ 0) or fore-
cast (for i > 0) of the value of the variable x at t+i
as of time t.4 Then, letting u denote the unemploy-
ment rate, ut+3|t represents the three-quarter-ahead
forecast of the unemployment rate formed during
quarter t, and ut–1|t the estimate as of quarter t of
what the outcome for the unemployment rate was
in the previous quarter.
As shown on the time chart in Figure 2,
using the unemployment rate as an example, the
forecasts reported to Congress in the February
Orphanides and Wieland
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4 Importantly, because of the lags with which information about the
past becomes available, we need to keep track not only of revisions
of forecasts but also of revisions regarding outcomes when trying
to understand the environment in which FOMC decisions were
taken. We later describe the data we use for outcomes.
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Table 1
FOMC Forecasts for 2007 and 2008 from the February 2007 Humphrey-Hawkins Report
2007 2008
Indicator Memo 2006 actual Range Central tendency Range Central tendency
Change, fourth quarter to fourth quarter*
Nominal GDP 5.9 43/4–51/2 5–51/2 43/4–51/2 43/4–51/4
Real GDP 3.4 21/2–31/4 21/2–3 21/2–31/4 23/4–3
PCE price index excluding food and energy 2.3 2–21/4 2–21/4 11/2–21/4 13/4–2
Average level, fourth quarter
Civilian unemployment rate 4.5 41/2–43/4 41/2–43/4 41/2–5 41/2–43/4
NOTE: *Change from average for fourth quarter of previous year to average for fourth quarter of year indicated.
SOURCE: “Economic Projections of Federal Reserve Governors and Reserve Bank Presidents” from the February 2007 Humphrey-
Hawkins report.
Table 2
FOMC Forecasts for 2007 and 2008 from the July 2007 Humphrey-Hawkins Report
2007 2008
Indicator Range Central tendency Range Central tendency
Change, fourth quarter to fourth quarter*
Nominal GDP 41/2–51/2 41/2–5 41/2–51/2 43/4–5
Real GDP 2–23/4 21/4–21/2 21/2–3 21/2–23/4
PCE price index excluding food and energy 2–21/4 2–21/4 13/4–2 13/4–2
Average level, fourth quarter
Civilian unemployment rate 41/2–43/4 41/2–43/4 41/2–5 About 43/4
NOTE: *Change from average for fourth quarter of previous year to average for fourth quarter of year indicated.
SOURCE: “Economic Projections of Federal Reserve Governors and Reserve Bank Presidents” from the July 2007 Humphrey-Hawkins
report.Humphrey-Hawkins report have exactly the
desired timing. That is, when t is the first quarter,
the three-quarter-ahead forecast of unemployment,
ut+3|t, corresponds to the February Humphrey-
Hawkins forecast of the unemployment rate in
the fourth quarter of the same year. That is, when
t represents the first quarter of a year, we have
(2)
where we employ the superscript HH to denote
the Humphrey-Hawkins forecasts.
Note that in Figure 2 under the heading
‘‘February Report” the solid arrow points to the
quarter on the time line for which the unemploy-
ment rate is predicted (t+3) and the dotted line
points to the quarter in which the forecast is made
(t). Similarly, for inflation, when t represents the
first quarter of a year, the three-quarter-ahead fore-
cast corresponds to the rate of growth of prices
from the fourth quarter of the previous year to the
fourth quarter of the current year, exactly match-
ing the horizon of the February Humphrey-
Hawkins forecast. Letting π represent the rate of
inflation over four quarters, when t is the first
quarter of a year, we have
(3)
For the July Humphrey-Hawkins reports,
some additional work is required to obtain three-
quarter-ahead projections; that is, we combine
available information to estimate the forecast of
the unemployment rate for the second quarter of
next year and the corresponding forecast of the
four-quarter growth rate of prices that ends in
the same quarter. The timing of the two July
Humphrey-Hawkins forecasts and the constructed
three-quarter-ahead unemployment forecast is also
shown with respect to the time line in Figure 2.
In this case, the dashed arrow refers to the three-
quarter-ahead observation for which an unemploy-
ment forecast is needed. To approximate the
unemployment forecast for the second quarter of
the following year, we simply take from the July
Humphrey-Hawkins report the forecasted unem-
ployment rates for the current year’s fourth quarter
and next year’s fourth quarter and average them.
That is, when t represents the third quarter of
the year, we set
ππ tt tt
HH
++ 3 3 | | ; .
uu t tt t
HH
+ + 33 | | ; ,
(4)
Other than the rare occurrence of when a
shock is known to have only transitory effects,
for a four-quarter interval that starts two quarters
later, it is doubtful that FOMC members would
have strong views about the likelihood of different
changes in the unemployment rate over the two
halves of that period. Implicitly, we assume that
the changes forecasted in July for the unemploy-
ment rate in each half of next year are about the
same.
The desired second-quarter-to-second-quarter
forecasts of the growth rate of prices is obtained
by constructing two forecasted half-year annual-
ized growth rates and then averaging them. In
other words, when t represents the third quarter
of the year, we set
(5)
where S stands for semiannual, so that π
S
t+1|t is
the inflation forecast for the second half of the
current year and π
S
t+3|t is the forecast for the first
half of the following year.
The inflation forecasted for the second half
of the current year, π
S
t+1|t, can be inferred from the
forecast reported for all of the year from a base of
last year’s fourth quarter, π
HH
t+1|t, and the estimated
inflation over the first half of the current year from
a base of last year’s fourth quarter, π
S
t–1|t. That is,
expressing all terms as annualized growth rates,




t+3|t, inflation over the first half of the
next year, we simply set it equal to the July
Humphrey-Hawkins forecast for all of next year.
That is, we set
(7)
The July Humphrey-Hawkins report does not
provide an estimate of inflation for the first half
of the current year, that is, for π
S
t–1|t. Thus, instead
we make use of alternative real-time data sources,
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based on the forecasts described above with rules
based on outcomes of these variables, we construct
parallel variables reflecting the latest historical
information available to the FOMC at the time of
their meetings preceding the two Humphrey-
Hawkins reports each year.
Thus, for the unemployment rate, we create
the variable ut–1|t, which for the February observa-
tion reflects the average level in the fourth quarter
of the prior year and for the July observation
reflects the average level in the second quarter of
the current year. Similarly, for inflation, we create
the variable πt–1|t, which reflects the four-quarter
growth rate of prices ending in the fourth quarter
of the prior year for the February observation and
ending in the second quarter of the current year
for the July observation.
An important aspect of our analysis is to
ensure that our definition of outcomes reflects
only information available to the FOMC in real
time. To that end, we rely only on data that would
have been available to the FOMC by early February
or early July. This implies that the data we use
correspond either to preliminary estimates, first-
reported quarterly data, or estimates based on
partial data for the quarter.
To match the timing of this information as
closely as possible, for the years 1988 through
2001 inclusive, we use BOG staff estimates of
outcomes ending in the prior quarter, which are
contained in the Greenbook that is distributed to
the FOMC prior to the early-February and early-
July FOMC meetings. Even so, because Greenbook
data remain confidential for five years, we cannot
rely on that source for the last few years of our
sample. Instead, for 2002-07 we use real-time
vintage data from the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis ALFRED database.5 For these dates we
use the data vintage from ALFRED that was avail-
able one week after the respective February and
July Humphrey-Hawkins meetings. We choose
this timing because FOMC members have the
opportunity to revise their projections during a





The interest rate rules we estimate all share
the following underlying structure with Taylor’s
(1993) rule. They posit that the systematic com-
ponent of monetary policy can be described as a
notional target for the federal funds rate, fˆ, which
increases with inflation, π, and real activity.
As already mentioned with regard to projec-
tions of real activity, we do not have information
about the FOMC’s assessment of the output gap.
Thus, we cannot directly estimate an exact coun-
terpart of the rule proposed by Taylor. Instead, an
indirect comparison is feasible using the unem-
ployment rate, u, as a measure of the level of
economic activity.6
Following Taylor, we restrict attention to a
linear specification of the rule and posit that7
(8)
Note that we do not have direct information on
the policymakers’ views regarding the equilibrium
interest rate, r*, the inflation target, π*, or the
natural rate of unemployment, u*. If these con-
cepts are roughly constant over the sample
period, then they would be subsumed in the
estimated intercept,
In estimating our specification, we need to
take an explicit stand regarding the explanatory
ar a a u u 0 1 = −− ( ) −
** *
π π .
ˆ faa a u u =+ + 0 ππ .
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5 As a robustness check, we have investigated how much the
ALFRED-based information differs from Greenbook information
in the years until 2001, when both are available. Although the
data source does influence the data values somewhat, the differ-
ences were small.
6 The difference between the unemployment rate and a constant
natural rate (NAIRU) can then be translated into an estimate of
the output gap by means of Okun’s law.
7 The linearity assumption is purely for simplicity in the spirit of
the Taylor rule. Nonlinear reaction functions, such as those char-
acterizing “opportunistic disinflation” examined by Orphanides
and Wilcox (2002) and Aksoy et al. (2006) and those incorporating
asymmetric easing near the zero-bound for nominal interest rates
as derived by Orphanides and Wieland (2000), would likely be
more-realistic but more-complicated depictions of policy.variable as well as the timing of the information
about inflation and real activity that the FOMC
takes into account in their policy decision.
Regarding the FOMC’s policy instrument, that is,
the interest rate on the left-hand side of the rule,
we use the FOMC’s intended level of the federal
funds rate as of the close of financial markets
on the day after the February and July FOMC
meetings.
Regarding the information on the current or
projected state of the economy, we set
(9)
where τ captures the particular timing. The
explanatory variables, πτ|t and uτ|t, are meant to
encompass the information variables to which
the FOMC may be reacting. In this specification,
τ = t–1 if the rule of thumb is outcome based,
whereas τ= t+3 if it is forecast based, that is, based
on the three-quarter-ahead projections.
Figure 3 again employs a time line to put the
timing of the explanatory variables into perspec-
tive, using the unemployment outcomes and fore-
casts as an example. Again, the arrows point to
the quarters to which the forecast or outcome
applies, and the dotted lines indicate the dates
ˆ faa a u t u t =+ + 0 π ττ π ,
on which the forecast or the estimate of the out-
come are made.
In our estimation, we also allow for the possi-
bility that the FOMC has a preference for policy
inertia and perhaps only partially adjusts the
intended federal funds rate, f, toward its notional
target, fˆ. We introduce such inertial behavior by
allowing the FOMC decision prior to a Humphrey-
Hawkins report to be influenced by the level of
the intended federal funds rate decided at the
FOMC meeting before the previous Humphrey-
Hawkins report. With our timing convention,
this can be written as
(10)
where ρprovides a measure of the degree of partial
adjustment. Thus, the restriction, ρ = 0, would
reflect an immediate adjustment of the intended
federal funds rate to its notional target.
Regression Estimates: 1988-2007
The results from our regression analysis using
our sample of Humphrey-Hawkins report data
from 1988 to 2007 are summarized in Table 3.
The estimates shown are obtained by non-linear
ff f tt t =− ( ) + − 1 2 ρρ ˆ ,
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The Timing of the Explanatory Variables in Humphrey-Hawkins Reports: Outcomes and
Forecasts of Unemploymentleast-squares regressions applied to the equation
(11)
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 show the results
for the outcome-based regressions with τ = t–1;
columns 3 and 4 show the results for the forecast-
based regressions with τ= t+3. Standard errors
are shown under the parameter estimates. In
columns 1 and 3 the restriction, ρ = 0, is imposed,
whereas in columns 2 and 4 the unrestricted
partial-adjustment specification is shown.
In all regressions shown in the table, we find
that the estimated rules of thumb suggest a system-
atic response to inflation and unemployment. The
response to inflation is positive and noticeably
greater than 1, suggesting that all of these rules
satisfy the Taylor principle. And the response to
unemployment is negative and also quite large,
suggesting a strong countercyclical stabilization
response. These findings are quite robust and
hold regardless of whether we employ FOMC
projections or recent economic outcomes and
ff a a a u tt t u t =+ − ( ) ++ ( ) − ρρ π πτ τ 20 1 || .
regardless of whether we allow for some degree
of interest rate smoothing or not.
However, not all specifications describe policy
decisions equally successfully. A comparison of
the regressions based on recent outcomes, columns
1 and 2, with those based on FOMC projections,
3 and 4, reveals that the forecast-based rules
describe policy decisions quite a bit better than
the corresponding outcome-based rules. We also
estimate a richer but more complicated specifica-
tion that nests the regressions with forecasts and
outcomes as limiting cases.8 Estimates of this
specification with an estimated weight on fore-
casts near unity (not shown) confirm the above
result. Furthermore, our results suggest a substan-
tial degree of inertia in setting policy.
We conclude that a rule of thumb that is based
8 In this case, the measure of inflation conditions in the regression
is defined as
Similarly, the measure on unemployment conditions depends on
the weight φ.
πφ π φ π τ|| t tt tt ≡− () + − + 1 1 3 .
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Table 3
Policy Reaction to Inflation and Unemployment Rates: Outcomes versus FOMC Forecasts,
1988-2007:Q2
Regressions based on Outcomes Forecasts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
a0 8.29 10.50 6.97 8.25
1.08 3.07 0.69 0.85
aπ 1.54 1.29 2.34 2.48
0.16 0.43 0.12 0.14
au –1.40 –1.70 –1.53 –1.84
0.21 0.55 0.14 0.17
ρ 0 0.69 0 0.39
0.14 0.06
R
–2 0.74 0.84 0.91 0.96
SEE 1.10 0.85 0.64 0.44
SW 1.00 1.03 1.74 1.94
NOTE: The regressions shown are least-squares estimates of
Here, f denotes the intended federal funds rate, π the inflation rate over four quarters, and u the unemployment rate. The horizon τ
either refers to three-quarter-ahead forecasts, τ = t+3, or outcomes observed in the preceding quarter, τ = t–1.
ff a a a u tt t u t =+ − () ++ () − ρρ π πτ τ 20 1 || ,on the FOMC’s own projections of inflation and
unemployment and allows for inertial behavior
can serve as a very good guide for understanding
the systematic nature of FOMC decisions over
the past 20 years.
The improved fit of the forecast-based rule
relative to the outcome-based rule also suggests
that at least some of the apparent deviations of
actual interest rates from an outcome-based Taylor
rule, such as described in Poole (2007), may be
easily explained once FOMC forecasts are exam-
ined. To explore this question further, Figure 4
plots the fitted values of the forecast-based and
outcome-based rules estimated in Table 3. The
upper panel of the figure contains the rules with-
out interest rate smoothing, which correspond to
columns 1 and 3 in Table 3. The black line denoted
‘‘Fed Funds’’ indicates the actual federal funds
rate target decided at each of the February and
July FOMC meetings from 1988 to 2007. The solid
blue line indicates the outcome-based rule and
the blue dashed line the forecast-based rule.
The figure confirms visually that the forecast-
based rule explains the path of the federal funds
rate target better than the outcome-based rule. Of
course, the fit is further improved once we allow
for interest rate smoothing, in other words, partial
adjustment of the funds rate depending on last
period’s realization. This can be seen in the lower
panel in the figure, where the paths implied by the
fitted outcome- and forecast-based rules, respec-
tively, are smoother because they take into account
the estimated degree of partial adjustment.
Based on the figure, we can identify five
periods where the outcome- and forecast-based
rules diverge from each other in an interesting
manner and that can improve our understanding
of the role of projections for FOMC policy deci-
sions. Two of these episodes, around 1988 and
1994, correspond to periods of rising policy rates.
In both of these periods, the FOMC was raising
rates preemptively because of concerns regarding
the outlook for inflation. Correspondingly, the
forecast-based rules track policy decisions better,
while the outcome-based rules only manage to
describe policy with a noticeable lag.
Two other episodes, in 1990-91 and in 2001,
correspond to periods of falling policy rates. In
both of these periods, the FOMC was easing policy
out of concern of a faltering economy, clearly
influenced by its projections of relatively weak
economic activity. Again, the forecast-based rules
track policy decisions better, while the outcome-
based rules exhibit a noticeable lag.
The last episode is 2002-03, when the forecast-
based rule correctly tracked the further policy
easing at the early stages of the recovery from the
recession, while the outcome-based rule suggested
that policy should have been considerably tighter.
Of interest are also two additional episodes
when the forecast-based rule did not track the
actual policy setting as well but where the result-
ing deviations can be explained by other factors
that are not part of the rule. The first of these is
the 1998 policy easing. On this occasion, the
FOMC was responding to the underlying financial
turbulence that intensified that fall, a factor not
well reflected in the rule of thumb, even consid-
ering its forward-looking nature.
The second and arguably more controversial
episode is the “miss” reflected in the forecast-
based rule during 2004. This is more controversial
because of recent criticisms that policy was much
easier during this episode than would have been
suggested by simple Taylor rules. This is evident,
for example, in Poole’s rendition of the classic
Taylor rule, reproduced in Figure 1. It has been
argued that this policy stance may have con-
tributed to the subsequent housing boom and
associated price adjustments and liquidity diffi-
culties experienced in financial markets (Taylor,
2007). Indeed, as is well-known, around 2003-04,
the FOMC was particularly concerned with the
risks of deflation and perceived an important
asymmetry in the costs associated with a possible
policy misjudgment. In particular, the costs of
policy proving too tight were perceived as con-
siderably exceeding the costs of policy proving
too easy.9 Under these circumstances, it should
be expected that even a rule of thumb that might
track policy nearly perfectly under normal circum-
Orphanides and Wieland
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9 The suggested rationale was the uncertainty arising with operating
policy near the zero bound. See Orphanides and Wieland (2000)
for a model demonstrating the optimality of unusually accommoda-
tive policy in light of the asymmetric risks associated with the
zero bound on nominal interest rates.Orphanides and Wieland
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Outcome-Based versus Forecast-Based Rules, 1988-2007
NOTE: “Fed Funds” refers to the federal funds rate target. “Outcomes” refers to fitted values of the outcome-based rule without and
with interest rates smoothing, that is, columns 1 and 2 in Table 3, respectively. “Forecasts” refers to the fitted values of the forecast-
based rule without and with interest rate smoothing, that is, columns 3 and 4 in Table 3, respectively.stances would not accurately characterize policy
and that policy would be easier than suggested by
the rule. Even so, we find that the forecast-based
rule, which is based on FOMC projections, tracks
the federal funds rate target quite well through
the first half of 2004 and that the only noticeable
deviation is that it would have already called for
much more aggressive tightening starting in the
second half of 2004 than actually took place.
Time-Variation in Natural Rates
One might have suspected that the FOMC
projections-based rule of thumb, presented in
Table 3, could have proved too simple to capture
the contours of FOMC decisions during the past
20 years. In that light, the explanatory power of
the rule shown in Figure 4 may be considered
surprisingly good.
One reason to suspect that a rule based on the
notional target,
(12)
might be too simple is the constant intercept. As
already mentioned, this would not be of concern
if FOMC beliefs regarding its inflation objective
and natural rates of interest and unemployment
were roughly constant over the estimation sample.
If any of the above exhibited time variation, how-
ever, a better description of FOMC behavior would
be in terms of the following similar, but not iden-
tical, rule:
(13)
which suggests a time-varying intercept,
Unfortunately, absent the necessary information
required to proxy the FOMC’s real-time assess-
ments of π*, u*, and r* in our sample, it is difficult
to examine if a version of the rule allowing for
such variation could explain the data even better
than the rule of thumb based on equation (12).
As a simple check in that direction, however,
we reestimated the rule using a possible proxy of
the FOMC’s likely perceptions of the natural rate
of unemployment, u*. Absent the FOMC’s own







* fr a a u u tt t t t t u t t t =++ − ( )+− ( ) ++ ππ π π 33 ,
ˆ
|| faa a u t tt u tt =+ + ++ 0 33 ππ ,
assessment, we relied on the real-time estimates
published by the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) over the past 20 years. This is the same
source of real-time estimates used by Poole (2007)
as a proxy for Federal Reserve staff estimates.
The results (not shown) were broadly similar
to those presented in Table 3 and Figure 4. As with
the baseline specification, the data suggest that
the FOMC projection-based rule can describe
policy decisions quite well. However, the overall
fit of our preferred forecast-based regression does
not improve with the inclusion of the real-time
CBO estimate of the natural rate of unemployment.
Rather, the fit deteriorates slightly. Two possible
explanations for this are as follows. First, the CBO
estimate may not capture the updating patterns
of the FOMC’s own real-time estimates of the
natural rate. Second, even in the presence of time
variation in the natural rate of unemployment,
countervailing time variation in the natural rate
of interest might keep the intercept in the rule of
thumb, a0,t, roughly constant. If so, correcting for
the time variation in u* without a parallel correc-
tion for the time variation in r* should result in a
deterioration in the fit of the rule.
Interpreting Changes in the FOMC’s
Preferred Inflation Concept
Another reason one might be concerned that
the rule of thumb based on equation (12), as esti-
mated in Table 3, might be too simple relates to
the FOMC’s choice of inflation concept. The deci-
sions of the FOMC to change its inflations projec-
tions, for example, from CPI to PCE in 2000 and
from PCE to core PCE in 2004, may be due to
changes in preference as to the most appropriate
concept for the measurement of inflation for policy
purposes. To the extent that the typical dynamic
behavior of each new measure differs from the one
used previously, FOMC members would proba-
bly have made adjustments in their systematic
response to movements in the inflation measure.
To gain some insight into the possible impli-
cations of the FOMC turning from the overall CPI
measure of inflation, to overall PCE, and then the
core PCE measure excluding food and energy
Orphanides and Wieland
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The top panel shows the three series (percentage
change in the price index relative to four quarters
earlier) for the full 1988-2007 sample. The lower
panel provides a detailed view of the most recent
10 years, 1997-2007.
As the top panel shows, from 1990 to 1998 the
three alternative inflation series steadily declined
more or less in lockstep with each other, with the
CPI series starting from a higher level than the
other two measures. The core PCE seems to best
capture the downward trend over this period. The
comparison suggests that, ex post, a policy rule
could have delivered fairly similar policy impli-
cations regardless of which of these inflation
measures was used over this period.10
From 1999 onward, the three series exhibit
some important differences. For instance, although
all three inflation rates indicate rising inflation
in 1999, the inflationary surge seemed much
stronger in the overall CPI and PCE measures than
in the core PCE. In fact, core PCE inflation stayed
largely within the Federal Reserve’s so-called
“comfort zone” of 1 to 2 percent all the way
through 2007. CPI and PCE inflation, however,
surged up two more times, in 2002 and in 2004,
with CPI inflation reaching 4 percent in 2006.
The overall PCE measure more or less follows
the movements of the CPI, albeit staying some-
what lower than the CPI throughout. Clearly, the
greater increases in PCE and CPI relative to core
PCE must have been related to the movements of
food and energy prices.
These differences pose a challenge in that the
different statistical properties of the alternative
measures could in principle influence, perhaps
in subtle ways, the specification of a rule of thumb.
One potential result of the switch from CPI to PCE,
for instance, could have been a change in the
operational definition of price stability embed-
ded in the rule, that is π*. Stated in PCE terms, π*
could be 50 or so basis points lower than the cor-
responding object stated in CPI terms, reflecting
recent estimates of the 50-basis-point average
difference in the two series. On the other hand,
given the uncertainty associated with price meas-
urement and the quantitative definition of price
stability most appropriate for monetary policy, it
is not entirely clear that such a change in the π*
embedded in a rule of thumb should be incorpo-
rated in the analysis when the FOMC changes its
preferred inflation measure.
In light of these uncertainties and the differ-
ential movements of core PCE, PCE, and CPI
inflation—especially from 2000 onward—we
decided to perform two experiments to help
examine how changes in the inflation concept
potentially influence policy.
One way to examine whether the policy rule
changed when the FOMC switched inflation
measures is to allow for changes in the intercept
and/or slope coefficients at those points in time.
We did so by introducing the appropriate addi-
tive and multiplicative dummy variables in our
regression equations and reestimating over the
full 1988-2007 sample. We consider possible
shifts in 2000:Q1 (for the switch to PCE) as well
as in 2004:Q3 (for the switch to core PCE). The
results (not shown) did not indicate any signifi-
cant shifts, suggesting the use of a new inflation
measure may not have resulted in a corresponding
change in the rule of thumb the FOMC used to
make decisions or that, because of the limited
sample, the change may have been too small to
identify.
Another way to examine possible differences
since 1999 is to reestimate the regressions pre-
sented in Table 3 using only the subsample
1988-99 to see if excluding the period following
the switch to PCE and later to core PCE would
materially influence the results. The regression
estimates, based on equation (11), are reported in
Table 4 in identical fashion as those in Table 3.
A comparison of Tables 3 and 4 shows that the
coefficients of the outcome-based rule change
quite a bit. This instability reinforces the prior
evidence that the outcome-based rule is misspeci-
fied as a description of FOMC policy because it
does not account properly for forecasts.
The key result in Table 4 is that the estimates
corresponding to the forecast-based rule for the
subsample ending in 1999 do not materially differ
from those corresponding to the full sample. This
Orphanides and Wieland
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10 Note, however, that these series are compared from the July 2007
vintage perspective and not the real-time policymaker perspective.Orphanides and Wieland



































































CPI, PCE, and Core PCE Inflation (vintage July 2007)suggests that the change in inflation concepts may
not have resulted in a corresponding change in
the rule of thumb describing FOMC decisions or
that this corresponding change may have been
rather small. Indeed, this is confirmed in the top
panel of Figure 6, which shows the estimated
forecast-based rule (dashed line) over the sub-
sample ending in 1999 and a simulation that uses
the parameter estimates from this rule together
with the FOMC projections through 2007. This
simulation confirms that interest rate setting in
the 2000-06 period seemed in line with a system-
atic interest rate response to FOMC projections
with the same coefficients, despite the change in
inflation concepts. Note that the results for the
policy rules do not include interest rate smoothing.
This finding is somewhat puzzling, especially
in light of the average difference expected in meas-
ured inflation in terms of CPI as opposed to PCE
or core PCE (approximately 50 basis points). One
might have expected that the switch to PCE would
be accompanied by a countervailing adjustment
in the parameters of the rule. Instead, use of the
identical rule with the PCE instead of the CPI,
assuming that PCE inflation forecasts are lower
on average than corresponding CPI forecasts,
would result in lower interest rate prescriptions
on average.
To get a sense of the magnitude of this effect,
we simulated the rule with parameters estimated
over the subsample ending in 1999, using the
Blue Chip consensus forecasts of CPI inflation
from 1988 to 2007. The results, indicated by the
dashed line in the lower panel of Figure 6, show
that from 1988 to the first half of 2002 the interest
rate prescriptions based on the Blue Chip CPI
forecasts are broadly in line with those based on
the FOMC projections. From the second half of
2002 to 2006, the rule simulated with Blue Chip
CPI forecasts implies a higher federal funds rate
target. In other words, if the FOMC had continued
to forecast CPI inflation and if its forecasts had
been similar to those of the Blue Chip consensus
from 2002 onward, the FOMC projections-based
rule of thumb would have suggested systemati-
cally tighter policy than the policy setting sug-
gested with the PCE and core PCE projections.
Orphanides and Wieland
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Table 4
Policy Reaction to Inflation and Unemployment Rates: FOMC Forecasts of CPI Inflation, 1988-99
Regressions based on Outcomes Forecasts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
a0 9.78 12.73 6.31 7.34
1.38 4.57 0.99 1.16
aπ 1.11 0.72 2.32 2.54
0.19 0.62 0.20 0.23
au –1.35 –1.68 –1.41 –1.72
0.25 0.71 0.17 0.22
ρ 0 0.69 0 0.41
0.20 0.08
R
–2 0.68 0.78 0.87 0.94
SEE 1.03 0.84 0.64 0.43
SW 0.98 1.18 1.65 1.96
NOTE: The regressions shown are least-squares estimates of
where f denotes the intended federal funds rate, π the inflation rate over four quarters, and u the unemployment rate. The horizon τ
either refers to three-quarter-ahead forecasts, τ = t+3, or outcomes observed in the preceding quarter, τ = t–1.
ff a a a u tt t u t =+ − () ++ () − ρρ π πτ τ 20 1 || ,Orphanides and Wieland












































Simulation Using PCE and Core PCE Inflation

























Blue Chip CPI Forecasts
Figure 6
Rules Estimated for 1988-99 and Extrapolated to 2007
NOTE: “Fed Funds” refers to the federal funds rate target. “Outcomes” refers to fitted values of the outcome-based rule without interest
rates smoothing, that is, column 1 in Table 3. “Forecasts” refers to the fitted values of the forecast-based rule without interest rate
smoothing, that is, column 3 in Table 3. In the lower panel, these two rules are simulated with CPI inflation outcomes and Blue Chip
CPI forecasts, respectively, from 1988-2007.CONCLUSION
Many analysts often rely on rules of thumb,
such as Taylor rules, to describe historical mone-
tary policy decisions and to compare current
policy to historical norms. William Poole’s (1971)
study, written explicitly to offer advice to the
FOMC, serves as an early example of such work.
Analyses along these lines also permit evaluation
of episodes where policy may have deviated from
a simple policy rule and examination of the rea-
sons behind such deviations. But there is disagree-
ment as to whether the canonical rules of thumb
for such work should draw on forecasts or recent
outcomes of key variables such as inflation and
unemployment. Poole (2007) points out that devi-
ations of the actual funds rate from the prescrip-
tions of a Taylor rule that relies on current readings
of inflation and the output gap may be the result
of systematic responses of the FOMC to informa-
tion not contained in these variables. He notes,
however, that much of this additional information
may be captured in economic projections. We
investigate this proposition in the context of
FOMC policy decisions over the past 20 years,
using publicly available FOMC projections from
the Humphrey-Hawkins reports that are published
twice a year. Our results indicate that FOMC deci-
sions can be predominantly explained in terms
of the FOMC’s own projections rather than recent
economic outcomes. Thus, a forecast-based rule
better characterizes FOMC decisionmaking. We
also identify a difficulty associated with the FOMC
switching the inflation concept it has used to
communicate its inflation projections. Finally,
we confirm that many of the apparent deviations
of the federal funds rate from an outcome-based
Taylor-style rule may be viewed as systematic
responses to information contained in FOMC
projections.
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